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PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE
ACTION
________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _APPEALS
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______.V
In the Matter of the Appeals
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
RICARDO DE LEON, ISIDRO TESIS,
ALIRIO SANCHEZ, LUIS A. DOMINGUEZ,
ROBERTO WEST, LUIS A. COLLINS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeals of
Ricardo De Leon, Isidro Tesis, Alirio Sanchez, Luis A. Dominguez, Roberto
West and Luis A. Collins hereinafter referred to as the "Appellants," from
the Adverse Actions of the Commission Removing them from its employ.
Hearings were held in the Commission's office on the following
dates:
Ricardo De Leon
Isidro Tesis
Alirio Sanchez
Luis A. Dominguez
Roberto West
Luis A. Collins

August
August
August
August
August
August

16,
18,
24,
24,
26,
26,

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

On the date of each of their respective hearings and except for
Appellant

Roberto

West, the Appellants involved appeared with their

representatives, Appellant West's representatives also appeared.
Commission
opportunity

was

duly

represented.

All

concerned were

The

afforded full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.

Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellants:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sieleman, Esq.
Angela Rodriguez
Employee Relations Specialist
Each
because

of

Appellant was

a

positive

Material

to

dismissed

test

these

from

showing

cases

are

the

use

Commission's employ

of

Chapter

an

illegal

drug.

792, Employee Health

Counselling and Assistance Program; Executive Order No. 12563 of September
15, 1986 issued by President Reagan and Chapter 751 Disciplinary Actions.
These three documents, in their entirety, are attached hereto and made a
part hereof respectively as Attachments A, B and C.
Certain provisions of each warrant highlighting as follows:
Chapter 792 Employee Health Counselling and Assistance Program.
Sub-Chapter l-2a.
Agency Policy:
a.

The

alcoholism,
treatable

Panama

drug
health

Canal

abuse,

Commission

smoking

problems.

The

and

recognizes
stress

as

Commission

is

concerned when the illnesses impair the efficiency and
safe performance of employee's assigned duties, reduce
employee dependability, or reflect discredit on the
agency.

The effects of alcohol or drug abuse on job

performance

include

absenteeism,

faulty

decision

making, and increased accidents.
Counselling
employee

and

who

Assistance

has

any

of

The Employee Health

Program
these

provides
problems

an
with

evaluation, counselling and/or treatment by health and
counselling professionals.

The goals of the Program

are to assist employees in overcoming health problems
in general,

and to

improve the

job performance,

satisfaction, conduct and attendance of

employees

whose efficiency has been diminished by these health
problems.
Sub-Chapter 3-1
Purpose of the Program;
The Employee Assistance Program provides a source
of help in confronting, dealing with and resolving a
variety of problems including alcohol abuse, use of
illegal drugs, stress management, marital and family
problems.
Sub-Chapter 3-4
Rehabilitation Program Completion:
An employee who actively participates in the
program
maintains

for

alcohol and/or drug-related

reasons,

sobriety and fulfills the agreement for

treatment made with the attending staff is considered
to have successfully completed the program.

In some

cases, a period longer than 12 months is required in
the

program

benefit.

for

an

employee to

receive maximum

In any case, if the employee has authorized

the disclosure of information by signing a consent

form, in accordance with Section 5-2 of this Chapter,
a memorandum will be sent to the supervisor noting the
completion

(and

re-enrollment

for

continuing

treatment, if applicable) of the Program.
Sub-Chapter 3-6
Re-Enrollment;
An

employee

who

successfully

completes

the

rehabilitation program and at a later date suffers a
recurrence of alcohol or drug-related problems may be
re-enrolled.

Re-entry into the rehabilitation program

may be provisional for employees previously terminated
from the program for noncooperation or for declining
the services offered.

Decisions on eligibility for

re-enrollment are made by the rehabilitation team (an
Occupational

Health

Division

physician,

the

Supervisory Occupational Health Nurse, the Employee
Counselling

Coordinator, and counselors).

Factors

taken into consideration for re-enrollment include the
employee's job performance, the employee's motivation
for treatment, the supervisor's recommendation, and
the

length

of

time

since

the

employee was

last

enrolled in the Program.
Sub-Chapter 3-7 a, b, c
Relationship to Disciplinary Action:
a.

Purpose.

Employees whose use of alcohol or

drugs interferes with the performance of their duties
should

be

offered

a

reasonable

opportunity

for

rehabilitation before decisions to take adverse or

disciplinary actions are effected.

If the employee

refuses to seek counselling, adverse or disciplinary
action should be taken as warranted on the basis of
unsatisfactory
attendance.

job

performance,

conduct,

and/or

In the case of illegal drug use, an

employee may be removed from Federal service upon the
first confirmed finding if the employee refuses to
enroll in rehabilitation counselling or upon a second
confirmed finding of illegal drug use.
b.

Safe harbor.

An employee who voluntarily

admits his drug use prior to being identified through
other means,

completes a rehabilitation treatment

program under the Commission's EAP, and thereafter
refrains from drug use, will be safe from discipline
for reasons of illegal drug use.
c.

Postponement of disciplinary action.

(1) If

a disciplinary or adverse action has been or is in the
process

of

being

(unsatisfactory

proposed
job

for

work

performance,

deficiencies
conduct,

or

attendance) or other factors related to alcohol or
drug abuse or illegal activity, upon recommendation of
the Occupational Health Division physician, employees
entering

the

program

for the

first

time

or re-

enrolling after successfully completing the program at
an earlier date, may be granted a postponement of
pending action for deficiencies related to alcohol or
drug

abuse

Program.

which

occurred prior

to

entering the

Any such postponement must be requested by

the employee.

The purpose of a postponement

is to

allow the employee to demonstrate job performance,
conduct,

and

attendance free

of

alcohol

or

drug

intake; it should not be considered to be a time of
freedom from job expectations or conduct, or a shield
from disciplinary action due to subsequent offenses.
If

the

employee

fails

to

cooperate

with

the

rehabilitation program, job performance, conduct or
attendance

requirements, any pending disciplinary/

adverse action may be effected and action concerning
the new problems may be initiated.
Executive Order No. 12563
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
including

Section 3301(2) of Title 5 of the United

States Code, Section 7301 of Title 5 of the United
States Code, Section 29033-1 of Title 42 of the United
States Code, deeming such action in the best interests
of national security, public health and safety, law
enforcement and the efficiency of the Federal service,
and in order to establish standards and procedures to
ensure fairness in achieving a drug-free Federal work
place and to protect the privacy of Federal employees,
it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1.
(a)

Drug-Free Work Place:

Federal employees are required to refrain from

the use of illegal drugs.

(b)

The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees,

whether

on duty or off duty, is contrary

to the

efficiency of the service.
(c)

Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable

for Federal employment.
Section 2.
(a)

Agency Responsibilities:

The head of each Executive agency shall develop

a plan for achieving the objective of a drug-free work
place with due consideration of the rights of the
government, the employee, and the general public.
(b)

Each agency plan shall include:
(1) A statement of policy setting forth the
agency's expectations regarding drug use
and

the

action

to

be

anticipated

in

response to identified drug use;
(2)

Employee

emphasizing
education,

Assistance

high

level

counselling,

rehabilitation,

and

Programs
direction,

referral

coordination

to
with

available community resources;
(3)

Supervisory

training

to

assist

in

identifying and addressing illegal drug use
by agency employees;
(4) Provision for self-referrals as well as
supervisory
maximum

referrals to treatment
respect

for

with

individual

confidentiality consistent with safety and
security issues; and

(5) Provision for identifying illegal drug
users, including testing on a controlled
and carefully monitored basis in accordance
with this Order.
Section 3.

Drug Testing Programs.

(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish
a program to test for the use of illegal drugs by
employees in sensitive positions. The extent to which
such employees are tested and the criteria for such
testing

shall be determined by the head of each

agency, based upon the nature of the agency's mission
and its employees' duties, the efficient use of agency
resources, and the danger to the public health and
safety or national security that could result from the
failure of an employee adequately to discharge his or
her position.
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish
a program for voluntary employee drug testing.
(c)

In

addition to

the

testing

authorized

in

subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the head of
each

Executive

agency

is authorized

to

test

an

employee for illegal drug use under the following
circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion
that any employee uses illegal drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the
agency

regarding an accident or unsafe

practice; or

(3) As

part

counselling
drug

of

or

as

a

follow-up

to

or rehabilitation for illegal

use through

an Employee Assistance

Program.
(d)

The head of each Executive agency is authorized

to test

any applicant for illegal drug use.

The

agency shall conduct their drug testing programs in
accordance with these guidelines once promulgated.
Section 5.
(a)

Personnel Actions.

Agencies shall, in addition to any appropriate

personnel actions, refer any employee who is found to
use illegal drugs to an Employee Assistance Program
for

assessment,

counselling,

and

referral

for

treatment or rehabilitation as appropriate.
(b) Agencies shall initiate action to discipline any
employee who is found to use illegal drugs, provided
that such action is not required for an employee who:
(1) Voluntarily

identifies himself

as a

user of illegal drugs or who volunteers for
drug testing pursuant to Section 3(b) of
this

Order,

prior

to

being

identified

through other means;
(2) Obtains counselling or rehabilitation
through an Employee Assistance Program; and
(3) Thereafter refrains from using illegal
drugs.

(c) Agencies shall not allow any employee to remain
on duty in a sensitive position who is found to use
illegal drugs, prior to successful completion of
rehabilitation through an Employee Assistance Program.
However, as part of a rehabilitation or counselling
program, the head of an Executive agency may, in his
or her discretion, allow an employee to return to duty
in a sensitive position if it is determined that this
action would not pose a danger to public health or
safety or the national security.
(d) Agencies shall initiate action to remove from the
service any employee who is found to use illegal drugs
and:
(1)

Refuses

to

rehabilitation

obtain
through

counselling
an

or

Employee

Assistance Program; or
(2) Does not thereafter refrain from using
illegal drugs.
Chapter 751 Disciplinary Actions
Appendix A-l-dfin part):
Disciplinary

or

adverse

actions

demand

the

exercise of responsible judgement so that an employee
will

not be penalized out of proportion to the

character of the offense...
The
Counselling

Appellants

do

not

challenge

the

consistency

and Assistance Program with the Executive Order.

of the
It is

obvious to me, and I so hold, that the Counselling and Assistance Program
is a precise and therefore correct implementation of the Executive Order.
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The

principal

challenge

by

all

or

virtually

all

of

the

Appellants is to the procedure of Removing an employee who is initially
enrolled in the Counselling Program because of a positive drug test, if
that employee tests positive again during twelve months in the Program or
within

the

Personnel

twelve

months

of the period

of

abeyance granted by the

Director.
Most of these cases involve employees who tested positive for

use of illegal drugs; whose Removal was held in abeyance by the Commission
because they then entered the Counselling Program, and who by the terms of
that abeyance would suffer implementation of their Removals if they failed
to remain drug free for twelve months in the Program and for twelve months
from the beginning date of the abeyance.

The pertinent parts of a typical

abeyance letter from the Commission's Personnel Director reads:
[You have been] notified of a proposal to remove you
from the service of the Panama Canal Commission for
unauthorized use of illegal drugs...
...it is my decision. . .that you be removed from the
service.

However, based on your expressed desire to

rehabilitate, your enrollment in the Panama Canal
Commission Employee Health Counselling and Assistance
Program. . .and your eligibility for postponement of the
adverse

action,

I

have

decided

to

hold

the

implementation of my decision in abeyance for a period
not to exceed one year from the date you receive this
letter, subject to the following conditions:
1.

You

must

agency's
Counselling

participate
Employee
and

11

in

the

Health
Assistance

Program

for a period of twelve

months, and you must successfully
complete the program.
£t .

.•

«

J .

...

4.

...

5.

...any violation

of

during

year

the

however,

one

will

implementing

be
the

conditions
period,

grounds

for

decision

to

remove you without delay.
D .

•• •

7.

...even a single incident of...a
verified

positive

drug

test

result...may be sufficient cause
for

implementing

the

Removal

(emphasis added).
By his signature, each affected Appellant accepted this and
other conditions.
The

Appellants'

foregoing condition.

challenge is to the

reasonableness of the

They asserted that a "relapse" during either of the

twelve month periods is to be expected in the course of treatment and that
it is unfair and unreasonable to dismiss an employee for that single
relapse.

Or, in short, that that rigid condition is not consistent with

Sections 1-2, 3-4, 3-6 and 3-7 of the program nor Chapter 751.
I do not agree.

The Presidential Executive Order, to which the

Commission is bound, mandates that consequence.

Moreover, I do not

consider it arbitrary or unreasonable, in the war on drugs in the work

12

place, and for employees in the safety sensitive jobs involved in these
cases, for the Commission which has given the employee an opportunity at
rehabilitation through a professional rehabilitation program and a chance
to keep his job when otherwise there is cause for his dismissal, to
require that employee to remain drug free for a twelve month period.
Though stringent and stern, the condition is consistent with a meaningful
rehabilitation

program

and

clearly,

in my

judgement,

a reasonable

condition for continued employment under the circumstances.

It meets the

requirement of Sub-Chapter 3-7 that employees "be offered a reasonable
opportunity

for

rehabilitation before decisions

to

take

adverse or

disciplinary action are effected." So the argument of unreasonableness in
that regard is rejected in all the cases in which it was raised.
The same is true for an employee who has any other "relapse" and
drops out of the program within the twelve month period, or is terminated
from the Program for poor attendance or other failures to follow the
Program's disciplines.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that enrollment in or reenrollment in the Program is not an automatic sanctuary from discipline.
It is a "safe harbor" only as defined in 3-7b of the Program.
enrollment is not guaranteed.
"may,"

that

re-enrollment

And re-

Section 3-6 makes clear, with the word

is discretionary

with

the

Commission and

conditioned on the factors set forth in the last sentence thereof.
Therefore, contentions in these proceedings that an employee is
immune from discipline if he enrolls in the Program after his illegal drug
use has been discovered or should be re-enrolled in the Program after
successfully

completing twelve months if he thereafter tests positive

again, are not supported by the conditions of the Program and therefore
are rejected where asserted in these cases.
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These and other issues, contentions and factual distinctions, if
any, will be dealt with in the discussions and Decisions of each case.

RICARDO DE LEON
On December 13, 1991, Appellant De Leon, a line handler at the
Locks was notified by the Commission of a "proposal to remove (him) from
(its service) for sleeping on the job, wasting time on the job, and
repeated instances

of unauthorized absences from duty and failure to

follow written leave instructions/procedures..."
On January 27, 1992 the Commission's Personnel Director upheld
the proposal of Removal, but, because of Appellant's enrollment in the
Employee Health Counselling and Assistance Program held the implementation
of the decision in abeyance, subject to the express conditions of the
"abeyance" letter of that date.
The Appellant admitted that he had an alcohol problem upon entry
into the Assistance Program.
Less than one year later on October 2, 1992, the Appellant
tested positive for use of an illegal drug.
specified condition of the "abeyance."

This was in violation of a

Condition #4 of the Personnel

Director's letter of January 27, 1992 provides in pertinent part:
Any violation of the conditions during the one-year
period...will be grounds for implementing the decision
to remove you without delay. . . .
Even a single incident of a verified positive test
result...may be sufficient cause for implementing the
removal.

14

Considering

this express violation of the conditions of the

abeyance and the Appellant's record otherwise, including prior progressive
discipline and continued unauthorized absences during the abeyance period,
the Commission had cause to impose the penalty it expressly warned the
Appellant would be imposed for those violations, namely Removal from the
service.
I have previously held that the procedure of an abeyance of
implementation of a Removal under the stated conditions with which an
employee must comply, constitutes the reasonable chance at rehabilitation
contemplated

by the Assistance

Program, the Executive Order and the

Disciplinary Actions.
The Removal of Ricardo De Leon was for just cause and is upheld.

ISIDRO TESTS
On April 20, 1992 Appellant Tesis, a Line Handler was notified
by the Commission's Personnel Director of "a proposal to remove (him) from
the services...for

(1) refusal

to carry

out a proper

order

from an

official of the Occupational Health Division as directed, i.e. undergo
drug testings, and (2) excessive and repeated unauthorized absences from
duty and failure to follow written leave procedures/instructions..."
Appellant

admitted

the

use

of

cocaine

and

requested

an

opportunity for rehabilitation.
The Personnel Director upheld the foregoing second charge and
Appellant's Removal from the service, but held the Removal in abeyance
because of Appellant's re-enrollment in the Assistance Program on March 2,
1992.

The Personnel Director's letter of April 20, 1992 set forth the
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specific conditions the Appellant would have to comply with during the
abeyance period of one year, including the condition that he remain drug
free.
On August 6, 1992 five months after entering the Assistance
Program under the "abeyance" conditions, the Appellant tested positive for
use of an illegal drug, thereby violating an express condition of the
abeyance arrangement.

Under that

circumstance, and considering the

Appellants prior unsatisfactory discipline
previously

progressively

record,

for which

he was

discipline, the Commission had the right to

implement the penalty that it warned

the Appellant would be imposed for

a violation of the abeyance conditions, namely the penalty of Removal.
My ruling holding the Commission's actions and the conditions of
the abeyance period to be reasonable, obtain to this case.
The Appellant's moving plea for leniency and for another chance,
with particular reference to the drastic impact on his family, especially
his children, that would result from the loss of his job, are matters not
within the authority of the Examiner to consider.

The Examiner's role is

to determine if the offense has been committed, and if so, whether the
penalty is legally proper.

Mitigating considerations in the face of an

Appellant's guilt, and where Removal from the service is a legally proper
penalty for that offense, are for the Commission to consider, not the
Examiner.
The Commission had just cause to Remove Isidro Tesis from its
employ.

His Removal is upheld.
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ALIRIO SANCHEZ
On January

3, 1992 the Appellant, a Drill Rig Operator was

notified by the Acting Personnel Director of the "proposal to remove
(him)...for unauthorized use of illegal drugs.
The allegation of that drug use is not denied by Appellant in
this proceeding.
On January 28, 1991 the Personnel Director wrote the Appellant
upholding the charge, but held the Appellant's Removal in abeyance "for a
period not to exceed one year from the date you receive this letter"
because Appellant had enrolled in the Assistance Program.
As in other similar cases, the "abeyance" was conditioned on
certain specific and enumerated requirements.

Among them (#4) states in

pertinent part:
"Any violation of the conditions during the one year
period...will be grounds for implementing the decision
to remove you without delay."
"Even a single incident of...a verified positive drug
test result...may be sufficient cause for implementing
the removal."
By his signature on that letter, the Appellant acknowledged and
accepted the conditions.
As of December 17, 1992, less than one year after receipt of the
abeyance letter, the Appellant tested positive for use of an illegal drug,
thereby

violating

a

condition

of the

"abeyance"

and

his

continued

employment.
As I have rejected the argument that the foregoing condition is
unreasonable and have held instead that it is a proper condition for both
rehabilitation and continued employment, especially for those in safety

17

sensitive jobs, which includes this "Appellant," I find that with this
violation the Commission had the right to implement the penalty it warned
the Appellant would be imposed for the violation.
The Removal of Alirio Sanchez was for just cause and is upheld.

LUIS A. DOMINGUEZ
On July 22, 1991 the Appellant, a Line Handler was notified by
the

Personnel

service...for:

Director

of

"a

proposal

to

remove

(him)

from

the

(1) Unauthorized use of illegal drugs; and (2) Reporting

for duty under the influence of an intoxicant and refusal to carry out a
proper order...as directed, i.e. undergo alcohol/drug testing.
The Appellant did not deny or contest these charges.
By letter of August 22, 1991, the Personnel Director upheld the
charges, but held in abeyance the Appellant's Removal from the service
because

of Appellant's enrollment in the

Counselling

and Assistance

Program.
That letter contained the usual specific conditions. Among them
is the requirement that the Appellant remain drug free for a one year
period (from the date the letter is received) as well as the requirement
that he successfully complete the Counselling and Assistance Program for
a period of twelve months.
The Appellant tested positive for drug use from a specimen
collected on December 16, 1991, four months after his Removal was held in
abeyance.

This violated the foregoing express condition of his continued

employment and made him subject to immediate dismissal.
My prior rulings upholding the reasonableness of the foregoing
condition, within the meaning of the Counselling and Assistance Program,

18

within the meaning of the Executive Order and Chapter 751 (Disciplinary
Actions) , obtain to this case as well.

Again I note, as in the prior

cases, that the Appellant occupied a safety sensitive job.
Accordingly, the Commission had just cause for the Removal of
Luis A. Dominguez.

The Removal is upheld.

ROBERTO WEST
The Appellant failed to appear at the hearing on August 26, 1993
though he received due notice.
I directed that the hearing go forward in his absence.
The Appellant was Removed for "unauthorized use of illegal
drugs."
By letter dated August 28, 1989 the Appellant was notified of a
proposal

to

"remove

illegal drugs."

(him) from the service...for unauthorized use of

He entered the Commission's Counselling and Assistance

Program on June 22, 1989, and his Removal was held in abeyance for one
year from the date he received the Personnel Director's abeyance letter of
October 10, 1989.
The abeyance was subject to the usual conditions, including the
requirement that Appellant remain drug free for that one year period.
Appellant's urine sample collected September 20, 1990, less than
one year after the October 10, 1989 abeyance letter, was positive for use
of an illegal drug.
Appellant thus violated an express condition of the abeyance
which he acknowledged and accepted. The Commission is therefore justified
in implementing the penalty which it warned the Appellant would be imposed
for that violation, namely the penalty of Removal.

19

My prior

rulings holding that the foregoing procedures and

conditions meet the test of reasonableness under Chapters 792 and 791 and
the Executive Order, obtain to this case as well.
Accordingly, the Removal of Roberto West was for just cause and
is upheld.

LUIS A. COLLINS
By letter dated July 23, 1990, the Appellant was notified by the
Personnel Director of the proposal to "Remove (him) from the service...
for unauthorized use of illegal drugs."
As the Appellant entered the Counselling and Assistance Program,
the Personnel Director by letter dated August 13, 1990, held the Removal
in abeyance for the usual twelve month period, subject to the regular
conditions including that the Appellant remain drug free for the one year
period.

The Appellant acknowledged and accepted those conditions of the

abeyance.
On November 30, 1990, the Appellant was terminated from the
Program

because

"he did not comply with

the treatment

plan."

The

Appellant was Removed from the service effective January 5, 1991.
In the course of the hearing, the Commission established by
direct testimony that the Appellant's failure to comply with the treatment
plan included a positive test for use of an illegal drug from a specimen
collected on March 23, 1990.
As the positive test for use of an illegal drug occurred less
than one year after the Personnel Director's abeyance letter of August 13,
1990, the Appellant violated one of the conditions of the abeyance. This

20

violation justified the imposition of the penalty which the Appellant was
warned would be imposed for such a violation, namely the penalty of
Removal.
Again, as I have stated before, the foregoing procedure and
conditions meet the test of reasonableness under Chapters 792, 751 and the
Executive Order.
Accordingly, the Removal of Luis A. Collins was for cause and is
upheld.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellants and the
Commission, renders the following DECISIONS:
The Removals of Ricardo De Leon, Isidro Tesis, Alirio
Sanchez, Luis A. Dominiguez, Roberto West and Luis A.
Collins were for just cause.

Their Removals are

upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner

DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.
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PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ — — — — — — — .— —.____ — — — — — — — —V

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
JAIME BOLANOS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Jaime Bolanos,

hereinafter

referred to as the

"Appellant," from the

Adverse Action of the Commission Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 18, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives
opportunity

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

his

appeared

to offer evidence and argument

and

representatives
were

(Representatives of the parties)

For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sielman, Esq.
David McConaughey
Equipment Maintenance
General Foreman

full

and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances

afforded

and

By letter dated August 10, 1992 from the Commission's Personnel
Director, the Appellant was notified of a proposal "to Remove (him) from
the Commission's service for "repeated instances of unauthorized absences
from duty and failure to follow written leave instructions/procedures..."
That letter not only sets forth the specifics of the charges but also
reviews the prior progressive discipline imposed on the Appellant.

That

letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Attachment A.
The Appellant does not deny the charges.

His defense is that he

has an alcohol problem; that he has been trying to overcome it through
voluntary

enrollment

in

the

Commission's

Employee

Counselling

and

Assistance Program; and that he should be given an additional chance to
rehabilitate himself in that program, including in-patient detoxification
treatment at a psychiatric hospital.
The record
Program

shows

that the Appellant was

in the Assistance

for one year, but did not complete it successfully.

I must

conclude that his failure to complete the Program successfully signifies,
along with his record of excessive absenteeism

and the other specified

rule violations, an inability or unwillingness to pursue a rehabilitation
program diligently and meaningfully.
The

Commission

does not

and

is not

required

to guarantee

successful treatment, nor is the Commission obligated to re-enroll him in
the Program

or supplement

it with

psychiatric care when his record

demonstrates, as it does, poor job performance and poor motivation for
treatment.

He has had a reasonable opportunity at rehabilitation within

the requirements and meaning of Chapters 792, 751 and the Executive Order,
and has failed at rehabilitation.

Moreover, that he may have been in the Assistance Program while
he accumulated his poor attendance record and committed the other rule
violations does not provide him with a sanctuary from discipline for that
continuing and accumulated record.

Sections 3-7b and c of Chapter 792

made that abundantly clear.
Accordingly, the Appellant's poor record, his prior discipline,
and the charges

admitted and therefore sustained

in this proceeding,

justify his Removal.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The Commission had just cause to Remove Jaime A.
Bolanos from the service.

His Removal is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
JAIME BOLANOS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned

(contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of

the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Jaime Bolanos,

hereinafter

referred

to as the "Appellant," from the

Adverse Action of the Commission Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 18, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives
opportunity

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

afforded

and
full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances

(Representatives of the parties)

For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sielman, Esq.
David McConaughey
Equipment Maintenance
General Foreman

By letter dated August 10, 1992 from the Commission's Personnel
Director, the Appellant was notified of a proposal "to Remove (him) from
the Commission's service for "repeated instances of unauthorized absences
from duty and failure to follow written leave instructions/procedures..."
That letter not only sets forth the specifics of the charges but also
reviews the prior progressive discipline imposed on the Appellant.

That

letter is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Attachment A.
The Appellant does not deny the charges.

His defense is that he

has an alcohol problem; that he has been trying to overcome it through
voluntary

enrollment

in

the

Commission's

Employee

Counselling

and

Assistance Program; and that he should be given an additional chance to
rehabilitate himself in that program, including in-patient detoxification
treatment at a psychiatric hospital.
The record

shows that the Appellant was

in the Assistance

Program for one year, but did not complete it successfully.

I must

conclude that his failure to complete the Program successfully signifies,
along with his record of excessive absenteeism and the other specified
rule violations, an inability or unwillingness to pursue a rehabilitation
program diligently and meaningfully.
The

Commission does not

and

is not

required to guarantee

successful treatment, nor is the Commission obligated to re-enroll him in
the Program

or supplement

it with psychiatric care when his record

demonstrates, as it does, poor job performance and poor motivation for
treatment.

He has had a reasonable opportunity at rehabilitation within

the requirements and meaning of Chapters 792, 751 and the Executive Order,
and has failed at rehabilitation.

Moreover, that he may have been in the Assistance Program while
he accumulated his poor attendance record and committed the other rule
violations does not provide him with a sanctuary from discipline for that
continuing and accumulated record.

Sections 3-7b and c of Chapter 792

made that abundantly clear.
Accordingly, the Appellant's poor record, his prior discipline,
and the charges admitted and therefore

sustained

in this proceeding,

justify his Removal.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The Commission had just cause to Remove Jaime A.
Bolanos from the service.

His Removal is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
Y

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
HECTOR MONTES
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — ——Y

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority

(43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned

was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Hector

Montes,

hereinafter

referred to as the

"Appellant,"

from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 25, 1993 at the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives
opportunity

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

afforded

and
full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esg.
National Maritime Union
Ozael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Adolfo Ceballos,
Chief, Warehousing Branch, Logistical
Support Division

The Appellant is charged with the theft of two bottles of liquid
Lux soap on December
house.

12, 1991 from the Commission's stock at its oil

He was dismissed by the Commission for this offense effective

April 24, 1992 after completion of the Commission's internal disciplinary
procedures.
The Appellant does not deny that he removed the bottles of Lux
soap from the Commission's supplies and acknowledged he planned to take
them

home.

This

admission,

in

the

course

of

the

Commission's

investigation, after the bottles were found in the Appellant's bag during
a search by a security guard, was made after the Appellant gave two other
versions of what happened.

Those two other versions need not be recited

herein because at the hearing the Appellant reiterated the admission, but
offered an explanation in either defense or mitigation.

He explained that

the Commission supplied bottled Lux to the employees to wash their meal
utensils.

And that instead of taking working time from his duties in the

office to wash those utensils, he decided to wash them at home and took
the liquid soap for that purpose.
The explanation is neither acceptable nor believable. To comply
with his plan, the soap would have to be used at his home only for the
meal utensils used at work, and nothing else.
improbably in the extreme.
two, large sized

That is implausible and

Moreover, if that was the plan, the removal of

bottles would be an excessive quantity.

Under any

circumstance, the attempted removal of the soap was unauthorized, improper
and can only be construed as a theft for the Appellant's personal use.
Accordingly the charges are sustained.
The

real

question

dismissal is too severe.

in this

case

is whether

the penalty of

The Appellant argues that he had no "felonious

intent;" that the Commission failed to exercise judgement in fashioning
the

penalty

of

dismissal

for

items

of

such

small

value

when

the

Commission's Schedule of Offenses and Penalties expressly authorizes, for
a first offense of theft, a minimum penalty of five (5) days suspension
and removal (dismissal) as the maximum penalty for a first offense.
It is well-settled

that theft of an employer's property is

ground for summary dismissal, regardless of the offending employee's prior
work record.

Here, the Appellant is a warehouse employee who has ready

access to the Commission's supplies.

In the face of the quantity of theft

which the Commission was experiencing, I have no quarrel with a rule that
mandates

dismissal

circumstance,

for

I would

theft
not

or

attempted

substitute

my

theft.

judgement

And

under

for that

that

of the

Commission in implementing such a policy.
But that has not been the Commission's uniform policy nor its
uniform penalty.

The schedule of offenses provides for penalties less

than discharge for theft, if, as here, it is a first offense.

I do not

interpret that schedule as confining the Commission to only either a five
(5) day

suspension

or removal.

By

implication

and

by the express

provisions of Appendix A Section A-l-2 of Chapter 751 Disciplinary Action,
penalties of suspensions in excess of five (5) days are contemplated and
allowed, as well.
The

record

Commission property

also

contains

examples

of

cases

of

theft

of

or "conspiracies to commit theft" of Commission's

property where the penalties were suspensions.
The

Commission

in this

case

has

not made

any substantive

distinctions among those cases, nor any distinction between them and the
instant case.

No

Commission witness

testified

as to why

other

theft or

"conspiracy to commit theft" cases resulted in only suspensions, and why
the instant case was so more serious as to justify dismissal.

Hence, on

the well-settled

industrial relations principle that punishment must be

evenhanded

employees

for

similarly

situated,

I

shall

reduce

the

Appellant's removal to a suspension.
The length of the suspension shall be for the period of time
that he has been removed.

I make it that long because he was an employee

of short tenure (three (3) years) and because he was not straight forward
or forthcoming in the investigation by the Commission, or at the hearing.
Before me, he persisted in his effort to justify his action and to escape
punishment for what was clearly wrong, by his contrived explanation.
I also make his suspension of that length as notice to him and
all other employees that a first offense of theft is not limited to a five
(5) day suspension, but may well be more severe, including discharge.
And finally, employees should be on notice that the Commission
need not tolerate theft, and that for the future, provided the Commission
shows the Hearing Examiner legitimate mitigating distinctions in prior
cases of theft in which the penalty was suspension; the offense of theft
will carry with it a presumptive penalty of dismissal.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner in the
above matter

and having duly heard the proof

and allegation of the

Appellant and the Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The

Removal

of

Hector

Montes

is

reduced

to

a

suspension for the period of time his has been out.
He shall be reinstated, but without back pay. The
period

of

time

reinstatement

between

shall

be

his
deemed

Removal
a

and

his

disciplinary

suspension for the charges sustained herein.

Eric xT.' Schmertz,
Hearing Examine
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
X

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
FRIEDELL BAKER

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned

(contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of

the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Friedell Baker, hereinafter

referred to as the "Appellant," from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 17, 1993 at the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives
opportunity

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

and

afforded full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.

The witnesses were duly sworn.

The hearing was

recorded.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarlane
(International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots)
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Adofo Ceballos
(Chief, Warehousing Branch, Logistical
Support Division)

The Appellant's dismissal was based on the charge against him
that on October 16, 1989 he committed the theft of four coils of rope
belonging to the Commission.
This is a dismissal case.

In such cases it is universally well-

settled that the burden is on the employer, here the Commission, to prove
the charge by a quantum of evidence that is clear and convincing. And, if
so proved, that the penalty of dismissal was appropriate.
The Commission has not met that initial burden of proof.
The principal direct evidence against the Appellant adduced at
the hearing is the testimony of Ismael Rivera, a maintenance worker.
Indeed, Adolfo Aballos, Chief of the Warehousing Branch, acknowledged that
until Rivera came forward and reported what he saw, he did not think the
Commission had

a provable

case.

Rivera testified

that he saw the

Appellant drive a fork lift truck carrying coils of rope to the rear of
van parked on the warehouse floor, elevate the lift to the level of the
van's rear loading area, get off the lift truck and push the coils of rope
into the van (the rear doors were open).
Rivera stated that he was seated at the desk in the carpenter's
shop; that

from

that

location he

first

saw the

van

driven to the

particular location by another employee (Jorge Loaiza); and that after the
Appellant put the coils of rope in the van, Loaiza, who had gone into the
office, returned to the van closed its doors, and drove it away.
Rivera's testimony contains one fatal frailty which nullifies
its conclusive value.

With the Appellant and representatives of both

sides, I visited the site of the incident, and positioned myself at the
precise location in the carpenter's shop where Rivera said he sat.
events were simulated.
Rivera.

The

A van was placed in the position testified to by

A fork lift track was driven the route described by Rivera, and

the alleged activity

at the rear of the van, replicating the alleged

placing of the coils of rope into the van, was demonstrated.
From the location at which Rivera said he saw the events, and at
which I positioned myself, it was impossible to see rope on a fork lift
truck being "pushed"
Rivera's location.

into the van.

The rear of the van was opposite

The most that Rivera could have seen was the approach

of the fork lift to the van, the legs of the Appellant after he got off
the van, and some movement of those legs in proximity to the rear loading
area of the van.

I can understand how he thought the movement involved

pushing the coils of rope into the van, but he could not see any such
action directly.
I am not prepared to conclude that the circumstantial evidence
of this event leads to the one conclusion that the Appellant put the coils
in the van.
in moving

The hearing record indicates that the Appellant was engaged
coils

warehouse.

of rope

from

location

that day

in the

That he transported the rope on a fork lift that day is not

inconsistent with that work.
fork

location to

That he apparently removed rope from his

lift at a location near or at the rear of the van is also not

inconsistent with that assignment, particularly, if, as he testified, his
job was to place the coils of rope at new locations in order to clear an
area in the warehouse for some other activity.

It has not been shown,

clearly and convincingly, that the activity at or near the rear of the van
was not merely the repositioning of the rope rather than its theft.
Moreover, the Commission has not shown in the hearing that rope
was missing from inventory, though apparently inventories were taken. The
evidence

on

that

indeterminative.

important

fact

is

most

inconclusive

and

hence

The pre-hearing file (joint Exhibit #1) indicates that

an inventory was taken shortly after report of the event and that same

coils of rope were missing.

But, the Commission presented no testimony on

that point at the hearing.

Indeed, the direct testimony at the hearing

was to the contrary.

Though several witnesses testified that they heard

or even took part in an inventory, those witnesses could not testify
definitely about the results.

But Supply Clerk Randolph Blake testified

that he remembered the inventory taken shortly after the incident and that
he heard Supervisor Navas tell managerial employee Foster that "all ropes
were accounted for" and that Foster replied "if complete, what's the
problem."
I recognize the hearsay nature of this latter testimony.

But it

was not rebutted by the Commission and no evidence was offered by the
Commission at the hearing that that inventory showed missing rope.

I do

not consider a much later inventory, which apparently showed more than
four coils of rope missing, to have any proximate or probative connection
to the charge in this case.
The Commission also relies heavily on its claim that during its
investigation, the Appellant denied moving coils of rope that day.
that

from that

And

falsification, the Commission logically and properly

concluded that because Rivera and Supervisor Coco saw him carrying rope on
the fork lift truck, the Appellant's denial was an attempt to divert
attention from his theft.
Commission witness,

But during the testimony on this point by the

Jorge Quiros, who was at that meeting, and upon

questioning by the Examiner, it became clear that what the Appellant was
denying at that investigative meeting was not that he was transporting
rope that day but that he did not put any of it into the van.

So, I find

no false denials at that investigative point.
Certainly there are circumstantial matters in this record which
create suspicion.

That the alleged theft took place during the Appellants

lunch period when, ordinarily he does not work through lunch (and the same
for Loaiza) ; that there were rumors that the rope was delivered by the van
to one of the employee's wives located at some pier; and that the van was
positioned by Loaiza at a location convenient to being loaded by a fork
lift, raise legitimate

doubts about the Appellant's innocence.

But

suspicions, doubts and rumors do not add up to clear and convincing
evidence, especially in a dismissal case.
The Commission has established that for a period of time,
including the time of this incident, it had been suffering large scale
thefts of merchandize

and material from the warehouse.

I hasten to

observe that the Commission has an absolute right, indeed a duty to take
vigorous corrective and preventative steps to guard against and stop theft
of its property.

Obviously, that legitimate objective is behind the

charges in this case, and I am fully satisfied that those charges were
made in good
committed.

faith and upon an honest belief that a theft had been

But again, in an adjudicatory forum such as this Appeal, good

faith and honest beliefs must be supported by acceptable evidence that
meets the clear and convincing standard.
Let me be clear.

I do not conclude unequivocally that the

Appellant did not commit a theft.

Rather, as is my authority, I conclude

that the Commission's burden of proving that charge by the requisite clear
and convincing standard has not been met.

On that basis, the Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing
Examiner,

and having

duly heard the proofs

and

allegations

of the

Appellant

and the Commission in the above-named matter, renders the

following DECISION:
The Commission did not show by clear and convincing
evidence that it had just cause to dismiss Friedell
Baker.

He shall be reinstated with full back pay,

seniority and benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner

DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
FRIEDELL BAKER
X

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120) , the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Friedell Baker, hereinafter referred to as the "Appellant," from the
Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 17, 1993 at the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

afforded

and
full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The witnesses were duly sworn.

The hearing was

recorded.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant;
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarlane
(International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots)
For the Commission;
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Adofo Ceballos
(Chief, Warehousing Branch, Logistical
Support Division)

The Appellant's dismissal was based on the charge against him
that on October 16, 1989 he committed the theft of four coils of rope
belonging to the Commission.
This is a dismissal case.

In such cases it is universally well-

settled that the burden is on the employer, here the Commission, to prove
the charge by a quantum of evidence that is clear and convincing. And, if
so proved, that the penalty of dismissal was appropriate.
The Commission has not met that initial burden of proof.
The principal direct evidence against the Appellant adduced at
the hearing

is the testimony of Ismael Rivera, a maintenance worker.

Indeed, Adolfo Aballos, Chief of the Warehousing Branch, acknowledged that
until Rivera came forward and reported what he saw, he did not think the
Commission had

a provable

case.

Rivera

testified

that he saw the

Appellant drive a fork lift truck carrying coils of rope to the rear of
van parked on the warehouse floor, elevate the lift to the level of the
van's rear loading area, get off the lift truck and push the coils of rope
into the van (the rear doors were open).
Rivera stated that he was seated at the desk in the carpenter's
shop; that

from

that

location he first

saw the van driven to the

particular location by another employee (Jorge Loaiza); and that after the
Appellant put the coils of rope in the van, Loaiza, who had gone into the
office, returned to the van closed its doors, and drove it away.
Rivera's testimony contains one fatal frailty which nullifies
its conclusive value.

With the Appellant and representatives of both

sides, I visited__th^__site^of the incident, and positioned myself at the
precise location in the carpenter's shop where Rivera said he sat.
events were simulated.
Rivera.

The

A van was placed in the position testified to by

A fork lift track was driven the route described by Rivera, and

the alleged activity

at the rear of the van, replicating the alleged

placing of the coils of rope into the van, was demonstrated.
From the location at which Rivera said he saw the events, and at
which I positioned myself, it was impossible to see rope on a fork lift
truck being "pushed" into the van.
Rivera's location.

The rear of the van was opposite

The most that Rivera could have seen was the approach

of the fork lift to the van, the legs of the Appellant after he got off
the van, and some movement of those legs in proximity to the rear loading
area of the van.

I can understand how he thought the movement involved

pushing the coils of rope into the van, but he could not see any such
action directly.
I am not prepared to conclude that the circumstantial evidence
of this event leads to the one conclusion that the Appellant put the coils
in the van.
in moving

The hearing record indicates that the Appellant was engaged
coils

warehouse.

of rope

from location

to

location

that day

in the

That he transported the rope on a fork lift that day is not

inconsistent with that work.

That he apparently removed rope from his

fork lift at a location near or at the rear of the van is also not
inconsistent with that assignment, particularly, if, as he testified, his
job was to place the coils of rope at new locations in order to clear an
area in the warehouse for some other activity.

It has not been shown,

clearly and convincingly, that the activity at or near the rear of the van
was not merely the repositioning of the rope rather than its theft.
Moreover, the Commission has not shown in the hearing that rope
was missing from inventory, though apparently inventories were taken. The
evidence

on

that

indeterminative.

important

fact

is

most

inconclusive

and

hence

The pre-hearing file (joint Exhibit #1) indicates that

an inventory was taken shortly after report of the event and that same

coils of rope were missing.

But, the Commission presented no testimony on

that point at the hearing.

Indeed, the direct testimony at the hearing

was to the contrary.

Though several witnesses testified that they heard

or even took part in an inventory, those witnesses
definitely about the results.

could not testify

But Supply Clerk Randolph Blake testified

that he remembered the inventory taken shortly after the incident and that
he heard Supervisor Navas tell managerial employee Foster that "all ropes
were accounted for"

and that Foster replied

"if complete, what's the

problem."
I recognize the hearsay nature of this latter testimony.

But it

was not rebutted by the Commission and no evidence was offered by the
Commission at the hearing that that inventory showed missing rope.

I do

not consider a much later inventory, which apparently showed more than
four coils of rope missing, to have any proximate or probative connection
to the charge in this case.
The Commission also relies heavily on its claim that during its
investigation, the Appellant denied moving coils of rope that day.
that

from

that

falsification, the

And

Commission logically and properly

concluded that because Rivera and Supervisor Coco saw him carrying rope on
the fork

lift truck, the Appellant's denial was an attempt to divert

attention from his theft.
Commission witness,

But during the testimony on this point by the

Jorge Quiros, who was at that meeting, and upon

questioning by the Examiner, it became clear that what the Appellant was
denying at that investigative meeting was not that he was transporting
rope that day but that he did not put any of it into the van.

So, I find

no false denials at that investigative point.
Certainly there are circumstantial matters in this record which
create suspicion.

That the alleged theft took place during the Appellants

lunch period when, ordinarily he does not work through lunch (and the same
for Loaiza) ; that there were rumors that the rope was delivered by the van
to one of the employee's wives located at some pier; and that the van was
positioned by Loaiza at a location convenient to being loaded by a fork
lift, raise legitimate
suspicions,

doubts

about the Appellant's innocence.

But

doubts and rumors do not add up to clear and convincing

evidence, especially in a dismissal case.
The

Commission has established that

for a period of time,

including the time of this incident, it had been suffering large scale
thefts of merchandize

and material from the warehouse.

I hasten to

observe that the Commission has an absolute right, indeed a duty to take
vigorous corrective and preventative steps to guard against and stop theft
of its property.

Obviously, that legitimate objective is behind the

charges in this case, and I am fully satisfied that those charges were
made in good
committed.

faith

and upon an honest belief that a theft had been

But again, in an adjudicatory forum such as this Appeal, good

faith and honest beliefs must be supported by acceptable evidence that
meets the clear and convincing standard.
Let me be clear.

I do not conclude unequivocally

Appellant did not commit a theft.

that the

Rather, as is my authority, I conclude

that the Commission's burden of proving that charge by the requisite clear
and convincing standard has not been met.

On that basis, the Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing
Examiner,

and

having

Appellant and the

duly

heard

the

proofs

and

allegations of the

Commission in the above-named matter, renders the

following DECISION:
The Commission did not show by clear and convincing
evidence that it had just cause to dismiss Friedell
Baker.

He shall be reinstated with full back pay,

seniority and benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner

DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
y

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
HECTOR MONTES
X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Hector Montes,

hereinafter

referred to as the

"Appellant," from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 25, 1993 at the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

and

afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Ozael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Adolfo Ceballos,
Chief, Warehousing Branch, Logistical
Support Division

The Appellant is charged with the theft of two bottles of liquid
Lux soap on December
house.

12, 1991 from the Commission's stock at its oil

He was dismissed by the Commission for this offense effective

April 24, 1992 after completion of the Commission's internal disciplinary
procedures.
The Appellant does not deny that he removed the bottles of Lux
soap from the Commission's supplies and acknowledged he planned to take
them

home.

This

admission,

in

the

course

of

the

Commission's

investigation, after the bottles were found in the Appellant's bag during
a search by a security guard, was made after the Appellant gave two other
versions of what happened.

Those two other versions need not be recited

herein because at the hearing the Appellant reiterated the admission, but
offered an explanation in either defense or mitigation.

He explained that

the Commission supplied bottled Lux to the employees to wash their meal
utensils.

And that instead of taking working time from his duties in the

office to wash those utensils, he decided to wash them at home and took
the liquid soap for that purpose.
The explanation is neither acceptable nor believable. To comply
with his plan, the soap would have to be used at his home only for the
meal utensils used at work, and nothing else.
improbably in the extreme.

That is implausible and

Moreover, if that was the plan, the removal of

two, large sized bottles would be an excessive quantity.

Under any

circumstance, the attempted removal of the soap was unauthorized, improper
and can only be construed as a theft for the Appellant's personal use.
Accordingly the charges are sustained.
The

real

question

dismissal is too severe.

in this

case

is whether

the penalty of

The Appellant argues that he had no "felonious

intent;" that the Commission failed to exercise judgement in fashioning
the

penalty

of

dismissal

for

items

of

such

small

value

when

the

Commission's Schedule of Offenses and Penalties expressly authorizes, for
a first offense of theft, a minimum penalty of five (5) days suspension
and removal (dismissal) as the maximum penalty for a first offense.
It is well-settled

that theft of an employer's property is

ground for summary dismissal, regardless of the offending employee's prior
work, record.

Here, the Appellant is a warehouse employee who has ready

access to the Commission's supplies.

In the face of the quantity of theft

which the Commission was experiencing, I have no quarrel with a rule that
mandates

dismissal

circumstance,

for

I would

theft
not

or

attempted

substitute

my

theft.

judgement

And

under

for that

that

of the

Commission in implementing such a policy.
But that has not been the Commission's uniform policy nor its
uniform penalty.

The schedule of offenses provides for penalties less

than discharge for theft, if, as here, it is a first offense.

I do not

interpret that schedule as confining the Commission to only either a five
(5) day

suspension

or removal.

By

implication and

by

the

express

provisions of Appendix A Section A-l-2 of Chapter 751 Disciplinary Action,
penalties of suspensions in excess of five (5) days are contemplated and
allowed, as well.
The

record

Commission property

also

contains

examples

of

cases

of

theft

of

or "conspiracies to commit theft" of Commission's

property where the penalties were suspensions.
The

Commission

in this

case has

not made any substantive

distinctions among those cases, nor any distinction between them and the
instant case.

No

Commission

witness

testified

as to why

other

theft or

"conspiracy to commit theft" cases resulted in only suspensions, and why
the instant case was so more serious as to justify dismissal.

Hence, on

the well-settled industrial relations principle that punishment must be
evenhanded

for

employees

similarly

Appellant's removal to a suspension.

situated,

I

shall

reduce

the

———___—••

The length of the suspension shall be for the period of time
that he has been removed.

I make it that long because he was an employee

of short tenure (three (3) years) and because he was not straight forward
or forthcoming in the investigation by the Commission, or at the hearing.
Before me, he persisted in his effort to justify his action and to escape
punishment for what was clearly wrong, by his contrived

explanation.

I also make his suspension of that length as notice to him and
all other employees that a first offense of theft is not limited to a five
(5) day suspension, but may well be more severe, including discharge.
And finally, employees should be on notice that the Commission
need not tolerate theft, and that for the future, provided the Commission
shows the Hearing Examiner legitimate mitigating distinctions

in prior

cases of theft in which the penalty was suspension; the offense of theft
will carry with it a presumptive penalty of dismissal.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner in the
above matter

and having duly heard the proof and allegation of the

Appellant and the Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The

Removal

of

Hector

Montes

is

reduced

to

a

suspension for the period of time his has been out.
He shall be reinstated, but without back pay.

The

period

his

of

time

reinstatement

between

shall

be

his
deemed

Removal
a

and

disciplinary

suspension for the charges sustained herein.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examine
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

:OUNTY OF NEW .YORK

)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.
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In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
LUIS E. ARAUJO

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Luis

Araujo,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"Appellant,"

from the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 18, 1993 at the offices of the
Commission.

Representatives of the Appellant and the Commission appeared.

The Appellant did not appear though he received due notice of the hearing.
I
ommission
opportunity

directed
and

the

that the hearing proceed
Appellant's

representatives

in his absence.
were

afforded

The
full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.
Appearances:

(Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azail Samaniego
NMU District Steward

For the Commission:
Offices of General Counsel
By: Glenn Heisler, Esq.
Alexandra Wong
Supervisory Administrative Services
Assistant, Gatum Locks, Locks Division
The Appellant was Removed on September 15, 1992 because of a
record of absenteeism, tardiness and failure to follow instructions.
The charges are not denied or refuted, and hence are sustained.
The letter dated July 27, 1992 from George A. Mercier, the
Commission's Personal Director to the Appellant, notifying him of his
proposed Removal sets forth the Appellant's record of poor attendance and
his

failure

to

instructions.

follow

instructions

It also sets

regarding

the

Appellant

and

leave

forth his prior disciplinary record of

reprimands and suspensions for those offenses.
of which

absences

That letter, the receipt

acknowledged with his

signature thereon, is

attached hereto and made a part hereof as Attachment A.
It

is

universally

well-settled

that

chronic absenteeism,

tardiness and failure to follow instructions are grounds for dismissal
whether or not the cause of those offenses is the employee's fault or
beyond his fault or control.

Here the Appellant was a Boatman in the

Locks Division, a job that needed to be filled daily and which, if vacant
because of absences or tardiness, directly impeded the efficient operation
of the Canal's locks.

The Commission is entitled to require regular and

punctual attendance from its employees, especially those in such essential
operating jobs.
The Appellant failed to meet that duty over an extended period
of time, and I have no choice but to conclude that his poor attendance
record together with the other related offenses had become a chronic.

Also, a record of these types of offenses warrants dismissal
after the application of progressive discipline.
that requirement.

The Commission has met

A series of reprimands and suspensions were previously

imposed on the Appellant.

He was given every reasonable opportunity to

improve his record, but failed to do so.

There is no doubt that he was

put on notice adequately that his record was unsatisfactory and that
unless improved to a satisfactory level, he would be dismissed.
His Removal was the proper culmination of his continued poor
record, and is upheld.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations presented

in the above

matter, renders the following Decision:
The Removal of Luis E. Araujo was for just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner

DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS

v

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of

LUIS COCO

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Luis

Coco,

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"Appellant,"

from

the

Commission's Adverse Action of Removing him from its employ.
A hearing
Appellant, his

was

held on August

representatives

23,

1993

at which time the

and representatives

of the Commission

appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarlane
Alternate District Steward,
International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sieleman, Esq.
:

Yolanda Valdes
Employee Relations Specialist
Personnel Operations Division

The Appellant was Removed effective

September

4, 1990 for

refusing to follow an order to undergo a drug test and for a second
offense of sleeping on the job.
Based on what the Commission asserts was "reasonable suspicion,"
the Appellant was ordered to take a drug test on April 24, 1990, and
refused to do so.
Sub-Chapter 4(3) of the Employee Health and Counselling and
Assistance Program reads in pertinent part:
Reasonable suspicion.
suspicion

When there is a reasonable

that an employee uses

illegal drugs, a

request for testing supported by written documentation
should be sent to the Drug Program Coordinator (PRDX)
by the branch chief or higher...
The Commission's Schedule of Disciplinary Offenses and Penalties
reads in pertinent part:
12 (b) . . .willful refusal to carry out any proper order
from a supervisor.
Maximum penalty:

Removal.

The Appellant did not deny at the hearing that he refused to
take an ordered drug test.

Indeed, in his testimony and in answers to

questions on cross-examination and from the Examiner he admitted that he
refused because he thought it was harassment by supervisor Quires. And by
refusing he thought he could bring the harassment to the attention of
superior officers of the Commission.
He

expressly

stated

that he knew

that

the consequence of

refusing the drug test was his dismissal and that he "risked his job" by
doing so.

Assuming the Appellant's reasons for refusing the drug test had
merit, his response was nonetheless insubordination in a well-recognized
form.

He should know, and I believe he did know that the universally

well-settled rule in such situations is that the employee is to comply
with the order, and if he thinks it is improper (or here, harassment) he
should

grieve under

the grievance and arbitration provisions

applicable collective bargaining agreement.
the Appellant but he did not use it.

This remedy was available to

Had he, the issue of harassment

could have been addressed and presented
Commission, as the Appellant wished.

of the

to higher

officials of the

He not only failed in his purpose,

but knowingly and purposefully committed an act of insubordination for
which dismissal is a proper penalty.
I am satisfied by the record, that the Commission had reasonable
grounds and a "reasonable suspicion" to refer the Appellant for a drug
test.

The Commission introduced official records showing the Appellant's

pattern of absences, tardiness, claimed illness, sleeping on the job, work
performance, and physical demeanor, which cumulatively present a prima
facie case of "reasonable suspicion."

Considering the safety sensitive

nature of the Commission's mission, the Presidential Executive Order with
which the Commission as an agency of the executive branch of government
must comply and which demands a drug free work place, the presumption must
be in support of an ordered drug test based on the kind of prima facie
evidence of reasonable suspicion present in this case.
In fact, though the Appellant claims that the use of the
"reasonable

suspicion"

evidence is also an example of supervision's

harassment,

he does not deny the factual accuracy of the record of

absenteeism, illness, tardiness, or his reported physical symptoms that
may reasonably result from drug use.

In short, I find no probative rebuttal in the record to the
Commission's official documentation of its "reasonable suspicion" as the
basis for ordering the drug test, and I find the Appellant's refusal to
comply with the order to take the test to be insubordination. Considering
the nature of the Commission's work, the Presidential Executive Order to
which it is bound, and the Commissions published schedule of Disciplinary
Actions, I find that the Appellant's Removal was for cause and was proper.
My Decision regarding the drug test makes a recitation of and a
formal decision on the charge of sleeping on the job, unnecessary.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, makes the following DECISION:
The Removal of Luis Coco for insubordination was for
just cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September

15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS

X

In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
JOSE PERINAN
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States
Code and Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and
between the Panama Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the
"Commission," and the Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29)
and the Decision and Order of the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(43 FLRA No. 120) , the Undersigned was appointed as the Hearing
Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of Jose Perinan, hereinafter
referred to as the "Appellant," from the Commission's Adverse
Action of Suspending him for thirty (30) days.
A hearing was held on August 16, 1993 in the offices of
the Commission at which time the Appellant, his representatives,
and representatives of the Commission appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Arthur S. Davis
Alvin McFarland
Alternate District Steward
International Organization
of Master, Mates, and Pilots

For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Clea B. Efthimiadis, Esq.
Rodrigo Teran
Acting Superintendent, Northern District,
Motor Transportation Division
The Appellant was suspended for thirty (30) days from May
24, 1992 through June 22, 1992 "for willful use of a government
motor vehicle for other than official purposes."
The undisputed facts show that on February 12, 1992 the
Appellant, a driver, went off his assigned route about 1/2 a mile
with the Commission vehicle he was driving to go to the carpenter
shop to pick up a picture frame for his personal use.

His work

assignment that day with the official vehicle was on a route to and
from the Motor Transportation

Division and Gatun.

To go to the

carpenter shop is unquestionably a diversion from that assignment,
and to do so to pick up an item for personal use is unquestionably
a violation of the Commissions regulations and applicable statutes
concerning the use of government motor vehicles.
There is no question that the Appellant knew of the
regulation
purpose.

against

the use of a Commission vehicle for this

He acknowledged so at the hearing.

The regulation is

posted on a sticker in each vehicle, and drivers are regularly
reminded of it in periodic safety meetings with supervision. It is
in written form in the M.T.D. Driver's Regulations.
In admitting the charge, the Appellant cites his 26 years
of service, his dedication to the Commission, and his truthfulness,
and seeks leniency from the Hearing Examiner.

The Hearing Examiner's authority is limited to decide if
the offense charged was committed, and if so, whether the penalty
is proper. Mitigating circumstances, such as those advanced by the
Appellant are for consideration by the Commission prior and at the
time it is decided to prefer charges.

If the offense has been

committed and the charges sustained, the Examiner has no authority
to substitute his judgement
penalty

imposed,

offense.

if that

for that of the Commission

penalty

is properly

related

on the
to the

In short, leniency or a less severe penalty than one that

is proper, is for the Commission to consider, not for the Examiner.
Especially so here, where by statute a thirty (30) day suspension
is mandated for willful use of a government vehicle for personal
purposes

(31 USC 1349).
There

suspension

has

has
not

been

no

showing

that

a

been the penalty in all

wrongful use of a Commission vehicle.

thirty

(30)

day

similar cases of

Hence, by practice and

statute it is the proper and required penalty in this case.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner
and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant
and the Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The thirty (30) day suspension of Jose Perinan
for willful use of a Commission vehicle for a
personal purpose is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss. :

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Hearing Examiner that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeal
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
CORNELIO RIVAS
-X

Pursuant to Section 252(c) (4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeal of
Cornelio Rivas, hereinafter referred to as the "Appellant," from the
Adverse Action of the Commission Removing him from its employ.
A hearing was held on August 19, 1993 in the offices of the
Commission

at

representatives

which
of

time

the

the

Appellant,

Commission

appeared

his
and

representatives
were

and

afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.
Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellant:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
Office of General Counsel
By: Glenn Heisler, Esq.
Catherine Cedeno
Supervisory Administrative
Services Assistant

By letter dated August 20, 1992 the Commission's Personnell
Director notified the Appellant, a Line Handler of the proposal "to remove
(him)...from the service for "repeated acts of misconduct."

That letter,

which sets forth the specifics of the charges as well as the progressive
discipline previously imposed on the Appellant, is attached hereto and
made a part hereof as Attachment A.
The Appellant does not deny the allegations.

He explains that

he tested positive for alcohol on April 30, 1992 because his step-son had
died and he drank following the funeral.
The

Appellant

asserts

that with

his

re-enrollment

in the

Counselling and Assistance Program on June 16, 1992, his Removal for prior
offenses

(the April 30th positive test for alcohol and the offenses

referred to in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e, and f of the letter of charges)
should have been held in abeyance for the usual one-year period during his
participation and treatment in the Assistance Program.
Section

3-6 Re-enrollment

of Chapter

792, Employee Health

Counselling and Assistance Program reads:
3-6

Re-enrollment
An

employee

who

successfully

completes

the

rehabilitation program and at a later date suffers a
recurrence of alcohol or drug-related problems may be
re-enrolled.

Re-entry into the rehabilitation program

may be provisional for employees previously terminated
from the program for noncooperation or for declining
the services offered.

Decisions on eligibility for

re-enrollment are made by the rehabilitation team (an
Occupational

Health

Division

physician,

the

Supervisory Occupational Health Nurse, the Employee

Counselling

Coordinator, and counselors).

Factors

taken into consideration for re-enrollment include the
employee's job performance, the employee's motivation
for treatment, the supervisor's recommendation, and
the

length

of time

since

the

employee

was

last

enrolled in the program.
Section 3-7c of the Program states in pertinent part:
"...employees entering the Program for the first time
or re-enrolling

after successfully

completing the

Program

earlier

be

at

postponement

an
of

pending

date

may

action

granted

a

for deficiencies

related to alcohol or drug use which occurred prior to
entering the program" (first emphasis added).
The record is not clear as to whether the prior offenses set
forth in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e, and f of the aforesaid letter are
"deficiencies related to alcohol or drug use."
Only if so, would he be eligible under Section 3-7c for a
postponement

of

disciplinary

action

for

those

offenses

by his re-

enrollment in the Program.
However, his last offense of May 5, 1992 before the positive
alcohol test of May 28, 1992 was punished with a ten-day suspension.
was also punished for the earlier offenses.

He

So, but for the subsequent

positive alcohol test, he would not have been dismissed.

It was the

positive alcohol test that triggered his Removal.
Two facts impel me to conclude that with his re-enrollment he
should

have

been

accorded an additional postponement and period of

abeyance, the offenses referred to in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e and f
notwithstanding.

To be re-enrolled, the rehabilitation team must have determined
that the Appellant's job performance and motivation for treatment were, at
least, adequate.

And that determination was made well subsequent to the

offenses referred to in sub-paragraphs b, c, d, e and f.
rehabilitation

In short, the

team apparently did not consider those offenses to be

disqualifying in terms of his job performance.
More important is the application of the express provisions of
Section 3-7c.

It provides that with re-enrollment the employee "may be

granted a postponement of pending action for deficiencies related to
alcohol which occurred prior to entering the program" (emphasis added).
The Appellant's positive test for alcohol abuse of May 28, 1992
was a "deficiency related to alcohol" which occurred prior to his re-entry
into the program in June 1992.
to that

use

of alcohol

If under that language discipline related

is postponed, the

event

that triggered

the

Appellant's Removal would not have had a triggering effect.
Put another way, if the effect of re-enrollment is to hold in
abeyance a Removal founded on the last event in a series of misconducts,
the Removal action is per force suspended too.
I

conclude

that

with

the Appellant's

re-enrollment,

that

consequence follows, and that his Removal was therefore premature.
I
deficiencies
Commission.

recognize
related

that
to

the

"postponement

alcohol..."

is also

of pending
discretionary

action for
with the

Section 3-7c states that such a postponement may be granted.

But, under the circumstances of this case, where the Appellant
once successfully

completed the Assistance

Program; when he was re-

enrolled in that Program after an apparent affirmative evaluation of his
job performance and motivation for treatment; and where he would not have
been dismissed but for a single incident of alcohol abuse prior to his

permitted

re-entry

into

the

Program,

the

proper

exercise

of

the

Commission's discretion should have been to accord him the postponement.
I am not persuaded, however, that the Appellant is entitled to
reinstatement with back pay.

A postponement of his Removal does not mean

to me that he is totally immune from any discipline for the positive
alcohol test of May 28th.

I think that act of misconduct warrants a

disciplinary suspension for the period of time he has been out.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellant and the
Commission, renders the following DECISION:
The

Removal

of

Cornelio

Rivas

is

reduced

to

a

disciplinary suspension for the period of time he has
been out.

He shall be reinstated but without back pay

or other monetary benefits he would have earned during
that period.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner
DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :
)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
xaminer that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION
ADVERSE ACTION APPEALS
In the Matter of the Appeals
DECISION OF
HEARING EXAMINER

of
RICARDO DE LEON, ISIDRO TESIS,
ALIRIO SANCHEZ, LUIS A. DOMINGUEZ,
ROBERTO WEST, LUIS A. COLLINS

Pursuant to Section 252(c)(4) of Title 41 United States Code and
Part 37 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation by and between the Panama
Canal Commission, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission," and the
Undersigned (contract No. CRA -94542- GB29) and the Decision and Order of
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (43 FLRA No. 120), the Undersigned
was appointed as the Hearing Examiner to hear and decide the Appeals of
Ricardo De Leon, Isidro Tesis, Alirio Sanchez, Luis A. Dominguez, Roberto
West and Luis A. Collins hereinafter referred to as the "Appellants," from
the Adverse Actions of the Commission Removing them from its employ.
Hearings were held in the Commission's office on the following
dates:
Ricardo De Leon
Isidro Tesis
Alirio Sanchez
Luis A. Dominguez
Roberto West
Luis A. Collins

August
August
August
August
August
August

16,
18,
24,
24,
26,
26,

1993
1993
1993
1993
1993
1993

On the date of each of their respective hearings and except for
Appellant

Roberto

West,

the Appellants involved appeared with their

representatives, Appellant West's representatives
Commission
opportunity

was

duly

represented.

All

also appeared.

concerned were

The

afforded full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.

Appearances (Representatives of the parties)
For the Appellants:
Orlando Diaz, Esq.
National Maritime Union
Azael Samaniego
NMU District Steward
For the Commission:
i*t

Office of General Counsel
By: Jay Sieleman, Esq.
Angela Rodriguez
Employee Relations Specialist
Each
because

of

Appellant
a

was

positive

Material

to

dismissed

test

these

showing

cases are

from

the

use

Commission's employ

of

Chapter

an

illegal

drug.

792, Employee Health

Counselling and Assistance Program; Executive Order No. 12563 of September
15, 1986 issued by President Reagan and Chapter 751 Disciplinary Actions.
These three documents, in their entirety, are attached hereto and made a
part hereof respectively as Attachments A, B and C.
Certain provisions of each warrant highlighting as follows:
Chapter 792 Employee Health Counselling and Assistance Program.
Sub-Chapter 1-2a.
Agency Policy;
a.

The

alcoholism,
treatable

Panama

drug
health

Canal Commission recognizes

abuse,

smoking

problems.

The

and

stress

as

Commission

is

concerned when the illnesses impair the efficiency and
safe performance of employee's assigned duties, reduce
employee dependability, or reflect discredit on the
agency.

The effects of alcohol or drug abuse on job

performance

include

absenteeism,

faulty

decision

making, and increased accidents.
Counselling
employee

and

who

Assistance

has

any

of

The Employee Health

Program
these

provides
problems

an
with

evaluation, counselling and/or treatment by health and
counselling professionals.

The goals of the Program

are to assist employees in overcoming health problems
in general,

and to

improve the

satisfaction, conduct

job

and attendance

performance,
of employees

whose efficiency has been diminished by these health
problems.
Sub-Chapter 3-1
Purpose of the Program:
The Employee Assistance Program provides a source
of help in confronting, dealing with and resolving a
variety of problems including alcohol abuse, use of
illegal drugs, stress management, marital and family
problems.
Sub-Chapter 3-4
Rehabilitation Program Completion:
An employee who actively participates
program
maintains

for

alcohol

sobriety

and/or drug-related

in the
reasons,

and fulfills the agreement for

treatment made with the attending staff is considered
to have successfully completed the program.

In some

cases, a period longer than 12 months is required in
the

program

benefit.

for

an

employee to

receive

maximum

In any case, if the employee has authorized

the disclosure of information by signing a consent

form, in accordance with Section 5-2 of this Chapter,
a memorandum will be sent to the supervisor noting the
completion

(and

re-enrollment

for

continuing

treatment, if applicable) of the Program.
Sub-Chapter 3-6
Re-Enrollment:
An

employee

who

successfully

completes

the

rehabilitation program and at a later date suffers a
recurrence of alcohol or drug-related problems may be
re-enrolled. Re-entry into the rehabilitation program
may be provisional for employees previously terminated
from the program for noncooperation or for declining
the services offered.

Decisions on eligibility for

re-enrollment are made by the rehabilitation team (an
Occupational

Health

Division

physician,

the

Supervisory Occupational Health Nurse, the Employee
Counselling

Coordinator, and counselors).

Factors

taken into consideration for re-enrollment include the
employee's job performance, the employee's motivation
for treatment, the supervisor's recommendation, and
the

length

of

time

since

the

employee was

last

enrolled in the Program.
Sub-Chapter 3-7 a, b, c
Relationship to Disciplinary Action:
a.

Purpose.

Employees whose use of alcohol or

drugs interferes with the performance of their duties
should

be

offered

a

reasonable

opportunity

for

rehabilitation before decisions to take adverse or

disciplinary actions are effected.

If the employee

refuses to seek counselling, adverse or disciplinary
action should be taken as warranted on the basis of
unsatisfactory
attendance.

job

performance,

conduct,

and/or

In the case of illegal drug use, an

employee may be removed from Federal service upon the
first confirmed finding if the employee refuses to
enroll in rehabilitation counselling or upon a second
confirmed finding of illegal drug use.
b.

Safe harbor.

An employee who voluntarily

admits his drug use prior to being identified through
other means, completes a rehabilitation treatment
program under the Commission's EAP, and thereafter
refrains from drug use, will be safe from discipline
for reasons of illegal drug use.
c.

Postponement of disciplinary action.

(1) If

a disciplinary or adverse action has been or is in the
process

of

being proposed

(unsatisfactory

job

for

work

performance,

deficiencies
conduct,

or

attendance) or other factors related to alcohol or
drug abuse or illegal activity, upon recommendation of
the Occupational Health Division physician, employees
entering

the

program

for the

first

time

or re-

enrolling after successfully completing the program at
an earlier date, may be granted a postponement of
pending action for deficiencies related to alcohol or
drug

abuse which

Program.

occurred

prior

to entering

the

Any such postponement must be requested by

the employee.

The purpose of a postponement is to

allow the employee to demonstrate

job performance,

conduct,

alcohol

and

attendance

free

of

or

drug

intake; it should not be considered to be a time of
freedom from job expectations or conduct, or a shield
from disciplinary action due to subsequent offenses.
If

the

employee

fails

to

cooperate

with

the

rehabilitation program, job performance, conduct or
attendance

requirements, any pending disciplinary/

adverse action may be effected and action concerning
the new problems may be initiated.
Executive Order No. 12563
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States of America,
including Section 3301(2) of Title 5 of the United
States Code, Section 7301 of Title 5 of the United
States Code, Section 29033-1 of Title 42 of the United
States Code, deeming such action in the best interests
of national security, public health and safety, law
enforcement and the efficiency of the Federal service,
and in order to establish standards and procedures to
ensure fairness in achieving a drug-free Federal work
place and to protect the privacy of Federal employees,
it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1.
(a)

Drug-Free Work Place:

Federal employees are required to refrain from

the use of illegal drugs.

(b)

The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees,

whether

on duty or off duty, is contrary to the

efficiency of the service.
(c)

Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable

for Federal employment.
Section 2.
(a)

Agency Responsibilities:

The head of each Executive agency shall develop

a plan for achieving the objective of a drug-free work
place with due consideration of the rights of the
government, the employee, and the general public.
(b)

Each agency plan shall include:
(1) A statement of policy setting forth the
agency's expectations regarding drug use
and

the

action

to

be

anticipated

in

response to identified drug use;
(2)

Employee

emphasizing
education,

Assistance

high

level

counselling,

rehabilitation,

and

Programs
direction,

referral

coordination

to
with

available community resources;
(3)

Supervisory

training

to

assist

in

identifying and addressing illegal drug use
by agency employees;
(4) Provision for self-referrals as well as
supervisory
maximum

referrals
respect

to treatment
for

with

individual

confidentiality consistent with safety and
security issues; and

(5) Provision for identifying illegal drug
users, including testing on a controlled
and carefully monitored basis in accordance
with this Order.
Section 3.

Drug Testing Programs.

(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish
a program to test for the use of illegal drugs by
employees in sensitive positions. The extent to which
such employees are tested and the criteria for such
testing

shall be determined by the head of each

agency, based upon the nature of the agency's mission
and its employees' duties, the efficient use of agency
resources,

and the danger to the public health and

safety or national security that could result from the
failure of an employee adequately to discharge his or
her position.
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish
a program for voluntary employee drug testing.
(c)

In

subsections
each

addition

to

the

testing

authorized

in

(a) and (b) of this section, the head of

Executive

agency

is authorized

to

test

an

employee for illegal drug use under the following
circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion
that any employee uses illegal drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the
agency

regarding

an

practice; or
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accident

or

unsafe

(3) As

part

of

or

as

a

follow-up

to

counselling or rehabilitation for illegal
drug use through

an Employee Assistance

Program.
(d)

The head of each Executive agency is authorized

to test any applicant

for illegal drug use.

The

agency shall conduct their drug testing programs in
accordance with these guidelines once promulgated.
Section 5.
(a)

Personnel Actions.

Agencies shall, in addition to any appropriate

personnel actions, refer any employee who is found to
use illegal drugs to an Employee Assistance Program
for

assessment,

counselling,

and

referral

for

treatment or rehabilitation as appropriate.
(b) Agencies shall initiate action to discipline any
employee who is found to use illegal drugs, provided
that such action is not required for an employee who:
(1) Voluntarily

identifies himself as a

user of illegal drugs or who volunteers for
drug testing pursuant to Section 3 (b) of
this

Order,

prior

to

being

identified

through other means;
(2) Obtains counselling or rehabilitation
through an Employee Assistance Program; and
(3) Thereafter refrains from using illegal
drugs.

(c) Agencies shall not allow any employee to remain
on duty in a sensitive position who is found to use
illegal drugs, prior to successful

completion of

rehabilitation through an Employee Assistance Program.
However, as part of a rehabilitation or counselling
program, the head of an Executive agency may, in his
or her discretion, allow an employee to return to duty
in a sensitive position if it is determined that this
action would not pose a danger to public health or
safety or the national security.
(d) Agencies shall initiate action to remove from the
service any employee who is found to use illegal drugs
and:
(1)

Refuses

to

rehabilitation

obtain
through

counselling
an

or

Employee

Assistance Program; or
(2) Does not thereafter refrain from using
illegal drugs.
Chapter 751 Disciplinary Actions
Appendix A-l-d(in part):
Disciplinary

or

adverse

actions

demand

the

exercise of responsible judgement so that an employee
will

not

be penalized out of proportion

to the

character of the offense...
The
Counselling

Appellants

and Assistance

do

not

challenge

the

consistency

Program with the Executive Order.

of

the

It is

obvious to me, and I so hold, that the Counselling and Assistance Program
is a precise and therefore correct implementation of the Executive Order.
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The

principal

challenge

by

all

or

virtually

all

of

the

Appellants is to the procedure of Removing an employee who is initially
enrolled in the Counselling Program because of a positive drug test, if
that employee tests positive again during twelve months in the Program or
within the

twelve months

of the period of abeyance

granted

by the

Personnel Director.
Most of these cases involve employees who tested positive for
use of illegal drugs; whose Removal was held in abeyance by the Commission
because they then entered the Counselling Program, and who by the terms of
that abeyance would suffer implementation of their Removals if they failed
to remain drug free for twelve months in the Program and for twelve months
from the beginning date of the abeyance. The pertinent parts of a typical
abeyance letter from the Commission's Personnel Director reads:
[You have been] notified of a proposal to remove you
from the service of the Panama Canal Commission for
unauthorized use of illegal drugs...
...it is my decision...that you be removed from the
service.

However, based on your expressed desire to

rehabilitate,

your enrollment in the Panama Canal

Commission Employee Health Counselling and Assistance
Program. . .and your eligibility for postponement of the
adverse

action,

I

have

decided

to

hold

the

implementation of my decision in abeyance for a period
not to exceed one year from the date you receive this
letter, subject to the following conditions:
1.

You

must

agency's
Counselling

participate
Employee
and

11

in

the

Health
Assistance

Program for a period of twelve
months, and you must successfully
complete the program.
£t •

• ••

J *

• *•

4 •

•* *

5.

...any

violation

during

the

however,

one

will

implementing

of

conditions

year

be
the

period,

grounds

for

decision

to

remove you without delay.
o,

...

7.

...even a single incident of...a
verified

positive

drug

test

result...may be sufficient cause
for

implementing

the

Removal

(emphasis added).
By his signature, each affected Appellant accepted this and
other conditions.
The

Appellants'

foregoing condition.

challenge

is to

the

reasonableness of the

They asserted that a "relapse" during either of the

twelve month periods is to be expected in the course of treatment and that
it is unfair and unreasonable to dismiss an employee for that single
relapse.

Or, in short, that that rigid condition is not consistent with

Sections 1-2, 3-4, 3-6 and 3-7 of the program nor Chapter 751.
I do not agree.
Commission

The Presidential Executive Order, to which the

is bound, mandates that consequence.

Moreover, I do not

consider it arbitrary or unreasonable, in the war on drugs in the work
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place, and for employees in the safety sensitive jobs involved in these
cases, for the Commission which has given the employee an opportunity at
rehabilitation through a professional rehabilitation program and a chance
to keep his job when otherwise there is cause for his dismissal, to
require that employee to remain drug free for a twelve month period.
Though stringent and stern, the condition is consistent with a meaningful
rehabilitation

program

and

clearly,

in my

judgement,

a

condition for continued employment under the circumstances.
requirement of Sub-Chapter
opportunity

for

reasonable
It meets the

3-7 that employees "be offered a reasonable

rehabilitation

before decisions to take

adverse or

disciplinary action are effected." So the argument of unreasonableness in
that regard is rejected in all the cases in which it was raised.
The same is true for an employee who has any other "relapse" and
drops out of the program within the twelve month period, or is terminated
from the Program for poor attendance or other failures to follow the
Program's disciplines.
Additionally, it should be pointed out that enrollment in or reenrollment in the Program is not an automatic sanctuary from discipline.
It is a "safe harbor" only as defined in 3-7b of the Program.
enrollment is not guaranteed.
"may,"

that re-enrollment

And re-

Section 3-6 makes clear, with the word

is discretionary

with

the

Commission and

conditioned on the factors set forth in the last sentence thereof.
Therefore, contentions in these proceedings that an employee is
immune from discipline if he enrolls in the Program after his illegal drug
use has been discovered or should be re-enrolled in the Program after
successfully

completing twelve months if he thereafter tests positive

again, are not supported by the conditions of the Program and therefore
are rejected where asserted in these cases.
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These and other issues, contentions and factual distinctions, if
any, will be dealt with in the discussions and Decisions of each case.

RICARDO DE LEON
On December 13, 1991, Appellant De Leon, a line handler at the
Locks was notified by the Commission of a "proposal to remove (him) from
(its service)

for sleeping on the job, wasting time on the job, and

repeated instances of unauthorized absences from duty and failure to
follow written leave instructions/procedures..."
On January 27, 1992 the Commission's Personnel Director upheld
the proposal of Removal, but, because of Appellant's enrollment in the
Employee Health Counselling and Assistance Program held the implementation
of the decision in abeyance, subject to the express conditions of the
"abeyance" letter of that date.
The Appellant admitted that he had an alcohol problem upon entry
into the Assistance Program.
Less than one year later on October 2, 1992, the Appellant
tested positive for use of an illegal drug.
specified condition of the "abeyance."

This was in violation of a

Condition #4 of the Personnel

Director's letter of January 27, 1992 provides in pertinent part:
Any violation of the conditions during the one-year
period...will be grounds for implementing the decision
to remove you without delay....
Even a single incident of a verified positive test
result...may be sufficient cause for implementing the
removal.
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Considering this express violation

of the conditions of the

abeyance and the Appellant's record otherwise, including prior progressive
discipline and continued unauthorized absences during the abeyance period,
the Commission had cause to impose the penalty it expressly warned the
Appellant would be imposed for those violations, namely Removal from the
service.
I have previously held that the procedure of an abeyance of
implementation of a Removal under the stated conditions with which an
employee must comply, constitutes the reasonable chance at rehabilitation
contemplated

by the Assistance

Program,

the Executive

Order and the

Disciplinary Actions.
The Removal of Ricardo De Leon was for just cause and is upheld.

ISIDRO TESTS
On April 20, 1992 Appellant Tesis, a Line Handler was notified
by the Commission's Personnel Director of "a proposal to remove (him) from
the

services... for

(1) refusal to carry

out a proper order from an

official of the Occupational Health Division as directed, i.e. undergo
drug testings, and (2) excessive and repeated unauthorized absences from
duty and failure to follow written leave procedures/instructions..."
Appellant

admitted

the

use

of

cocaine

and

requested

an

opportunity for rehabilitation.
The Personnel Director upheld the foregoing second charge and
Appellant's Removal from the service, but held the Removal in abeyance
because of Appellant's re-enrollment in the Assistance Program on March 2,
1992.

The Personnel Director's letter of April 20, 1992 set forth the
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specific conditions the Appellant would have to comply with during the
abeyance period of one year, including the condition that he remain drug
free.
On August

6, 1992 five months after entering the Assistance

Program under the "abeyance" conditions, the Appellant tested positive for
use of an illegal drug, thereby violating an express condition of the
abeyance

arrangement.

Appellants

prior

previously

progressively

Under that

circumstance, and considering

unsatisfactory discipline

the

record,

for which he was

discipline, the Commission

had the right to

implement the penalty that it warned

the Appellant would be imposed for

a violation of the abeyance conditions, namely the penalty of Removal.
My ruling holding the Commission's actions and the conditions of
the abeyance period to be reasonable, obtain to this case.
The Appellant's moving plea for leniency and for another chance,
with particular reference to the drastic impact on his family, especially
his children, that would result from the loss of his job, are matters not
within the authority of the Examiner to consider.

The Examiner's role is

to determine if the offense has been committed, and if so, whether the
penalty is legally proper.

Mitigating considerations in the face of an

Appellant's guilt, and where Removal from the service is a legally proper
penalty for that offense, are for the Commission to consider, not the
Examiner.
The Commission had just cause to Remove Isidro Tesis from its
employ.

His Removal is upheld.
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ALIRIO SANCHEZ
On January 3, 1992 the Appellant, a Drill Rig Operator was
notified by the Acting Personnel Director of the "proposal to remove
(him)...for unauthorized use of illegal drugs.
The allegation of that drug use is not denied by Appellant in
this proceeding.
On January 28, 1991 the Personnel Director wrote the Appellant
upholding the charge, but held the Appellant's Removal in abeyance "for a
period not to exceed one year from the date you receive this letter"
because Appellant had enrolled in the Assistance Program.
As in other similar cases, the "abeyance" was conditioned on
certain specific and enumerated requirements.

Among them (#4) states in

pertinent part:
"Any violation of the conditions during the one year
period...will be grounds for implementing the decision
to remove you without delay."
"Even a single incident of...a verified positive drug
test result...may be sufficient cause for implementing
the removal."
By his signature on that letter, the Appellant acknowledged and
accepted the conditions.
As of December 17, 1992, less than one year after receipt of the
abeyance letter, the Appellant tested positive for use of an illegal drug,
thereby

violating

a

condition of the

"abeyance" and

his continued

employment.
As I have rejected the argument that the foregoing condition is
unreasonable and have held instead that it is a proper condition for both
rehabilitation and continued employment, especially for those in safety
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sensitive

jobs, which includes this "Appellant," I find that with this

violation the Commission had the right to implement the penalty it warned
the Appellant would be imposed for the violation.
The Removal of Alirio Sanchez was for just cause and is upheld.

LUIS A. DOMINGUEZ
On July 22, 1991 the Appellant, a Line Handler was notified by
the

Personnel

service...for:

Director

of

"a

proposal

to

remove

(him)

from

the

(1) Unauthorized use of illegal drugs; and (2) Reporting

for duty under the influence of an intoxicant and refusal to carry out a
proper order...as directed, i.e. undergo alcohol/drug

testing.

The Appellant did not deny or contest these charges.
By letter of August 22, 1991, the Personnel Director upheld the
charges, but held in abeyance the Appellant's Removal from the service
because

of Appellant's

enrollment

in the

Counselling

and Assistance

Program.
That letter contained the usual specific conditions.

Among them

is the requirement that the Appellant remain drug free for a one year
period (from the date the letter is received) as well as the requirement
that he successfully complete the Counselling and Assistance Program for
a period of twelve months.
The Appellant tested positive for drug use from a specimen
collected on December 16, 1991, four months after his Removal was held in
abeyance.

This violated the foregoing express condition of his continued

employment and made him subject to immediate dismissal.
My prior rulings upholding the reasonableness of the foregoing
condition, within the meaning of the Counselling and Assistance Program,
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within the meaning of the Executive Order and Chapter 751 (Disciplinary
Actions) , obtain to this case as well.

Again I note, as in the prior

cases, that the Appellant occupied a safety sensitive job.
Accordingly, the Commission had just cause for the Removal of
Luis A. Dominguez.

The Removal is upheld.

ROBERTO WEST
The Appellant failed to appear at the hearing on August 26, 1993
though he received due notice.
I directed that the hearing go forward in his absence.
The Appellant was Removed for "unauthorized use of illegal
drugs."
By letter dated August 28, 1989 the Appellant was notified of a
proposal to "remove
illegal drugs."

(him) from the service...for unauthorized use of

He entered the Commission's Counselling and Assistance

Program on June 22, 1989, and his Removal was held in abeyance for one
year from the date he received the Personnel Director's abeyance letter of
October 10, 1989.
The abeyance was subject to the usual conditions, including the
reguirement that Appellant remain drug free for that one year period.
Appellant's urine sample collected September 20, 1990, less than
one year after the October 10, 1989 abeyance letter, was positive for use
of an illegal drug.
Appellant thus violated an express condition of the abeyance
which he acknowledged and accepted. The Commission is therefore justified
in implementing the penalty which it warned the Appellant would be imposed
for that violation, namely the penalty of Removal.
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My prior rulings holding that the foregoing procedures and
conditions meet the test of reasonableness under Chapters 792 and 791 and
the Executive Order, obtain to this case as well.
Accordingly, the Removal of Roberto West was for just cause and
is upheld.

LUIS A. COLLINS
By letter dated July 23, 1990, the Appellant was notified by the
Personnel Director of the proposal to "Remove (him) from the service. . .
for unauthorized use of illegal drugs."
As the Appellant entered the Counselling and Assistance Program,
the Personnel Director by letter dated August 13, 1990, held the Removal
in abeyance for the usual twelve month period, subject to the regular
conditions including that the Appellant remain drug free for the one year
period.

The Appellant acknowledged and accepted those conditions of the

abeyance.
On November 30, 1990, the Appellant was terminated from the
Program

because

"he did not comply with the treatment

plan."

The

Appellant was Removed from the service effective January 5, 1991.
In the course of the hearing, the Commission established by
direct testimony that the Appellant's failure to comply with the treatment
plan included a positive test for use of an illegal drug from a specimen
collected on March 23, 1990.
As the positive test for use of an illegal drug occurred less
than one year after the Personnel Director's abeyance letter of August 13,
1990, the Appellant violated one of the conditions of the abeyance.
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This

violation justified the imposition of the penalty which the Appellant was
warned would be imposed for such a violation, namely the penalty of
Removal.
Again, as I have stated before, the foregoing procedure and
conditions meet the test of reasonableness under Chapters 792, 751 and the
Executive Order.
Accordingly, the Removal of Luis A. Collins was for cause and is
upheld.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Hearing Examiner, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Appellants and the
Commission, renders the following DECISIONS:
The Removals of Ricardo De Leon, Isidro Tesis, Alirio
Sanchez, Luis A. Dominiguez, Roberto West and Luis A.
Collins were

for just cause.

Their Removals are

upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz,
Hearing Examiner

DATED:

September 15, 1993

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss. :

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Hearing
Examiner that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my DECISION.
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Impartial Chairman, Transport Workers Union of America
Local 100, -and- New York Bus Service

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Transport Workers Union of American
Local 100

AWARD

and
Parochial Bus Systems, Inc., New York
Bus Tours and Affiliated Companies

The stipulated issue is the propriety of the discharge of Arthur
Porter.

The above-named Union and Company have settled the foregoing
issue and dispute and have entered a Settlement Agreement, dated
March 1, 1993. At the request of the Union and the Company, I make
that Settlement Agreement my Award as follows:

AGREEMENT, made this 1st day of March 1993 by
and between PAROCHIAL BUS SYSTEMS, INC., NEW
YORK BUS TOURS, INC., and affiliated companies,
Interstate 95 at Exit 13, Bronx, New York, 10475
(hereinafter the "Employer), TRANSPORT WORKERS
UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAL 100, AFL-CIO, 80 West

-2-

End Avenue, New York, New York 10023, (hereinafter the "Union"), and ARTHUR PORTER, 2923
De Witt Place, Bronx, New York 10469, (hereinafter "Porter").
WHEREAS, the Employer on February 8, 1993 discharged employee Porter for certain alleged violations of Company rules and regulations, including permitting an unauthorized passenger on the
bus to which he was assigned, driving the bus on
an unauthorized route, leaving the bus unattended
and making personal use of the bus; and
WHEREAS, an arbitration hearing was scheduled
for March 5, 1993 before Eric J. Schmertz,
Impartial Arbitrator, on the grievance filed by
the Union claiming that the Employer did not have
cause to discharge Porter; and
WHEREAS, the Employer, the Union and Porter wish
to resolve said grievance amicably without further
contractual or legal proceedings;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1. The Employer shall reinstate Porter to his former
position of employment, which action was taken on
March 1, 1993.
2. Porter waives all claims for loss of wages and
holiday benefits during the period from February 8.
1993 through February 28, 1993.
3. Porter hereby agrees that he will retire from the
Employer effective October 31, 1993 and the Employer
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agrees that he will be entitled to receive retirement
and pension benefits commencing November 1, 1993.
4. Should Porter fail to comply with all applicable
rules and regulations of the Employer during the remaining period of his employment, he shall be subject
to further discipline, including if warranted, discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
DATED: APRIL 19, 1993
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss.

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
DISCIPLINARY HEARING

n the Matter of the Discipline :
of

:

Gerard Paril

:

DECISION OF HEARING OFFICER

The Port Authority seeks the discharge of Gerard Paril for a series of
offenses set forth in the Charges and Specification (Docket No. 832). (A
summary of said Charges and Specifications is attached hereto and made a
part hereof as Attachment A).
A hearing was held on September 17, 1993 before the Undersigned, duly
designated as the Hearing Officer.
Despite receipt of due notice of the scheduled hearing by registered mail,
Mr. Paril failed to appear at the hearing. Representatives of the Port Authority
appeared. In response to a motion by the Port Authority the Hearing Officer
directed that the hearing proceed.
The proofs and allegations of the Port Authority were heard. Based
thereon, the Charges and Specifications have been proved.
The charges are sustained.
Also, by his failure to appear at the hearing, Mr. Paril has "waived" his

ight to such hearing.
Article VII of Disciplinary Proceedings, second paragraph of Section A
eads in pertinent part:
"...the failure to appear at a hearing after notice
shall constitute a waiver of such hearing..."
I find no excusable reason for Mr. Paril's failure to appear. Accordingly,
his right to the instant hearing has been waived.
For both of the foregoing reasons - the charges as sustained herein, and
his failure to appear at the hearing after due notice - the recommendation and
request of the Port Authority that Mr. Paril be dismissed, is granted.

Eric J. Schmertz
Hearing Officer
DATED: September 21, 1993
STATE OF: New York )
COUNTY OF: New York )ss:.
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator that I
am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my
Award.
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On June 29, 1992, in resolution of pending disciplinary charges
before Hearing Officer E. Schmertz; Esq., you agreed to a penalty that
included a final warning, reassignment to another facility, and set a
3-week deadline for attaining your CDL, for having failed to have and/or
produce a valid driver's license for an indefinite period of time
commencing in August, 1990, and for ten (10) occasions of absence with out
leave (AVOL) totaling fifty seven (57) days and three and a half (3 and
1/2) hours.
Despite this prior disciplinary action, on April 22, 1993, you were
arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey, during your tour of duty for the
commission of the following act: Unlawful taking of means of conveyance, in
violation of N.J. State Statue 2C:20-10, as specified in Charge 1,
Specification 1.
On April 22, 1993, you were arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey,
during your tour of duty for the commission of the following act:
Possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of N.J. State Statue
2C:36-2, as specified in Charge 1, Specification 2.
On April 22, 1993, you were arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey,
during your tour of duty for the commission of the following act: Under the
influence of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, in violation of N.J. State
Statue 2C:35-10b, as specified in Charge 1, Specification 3.
On April 22, 1993, you were arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey,
during your tour of duty for the commission of the following act: Operating
a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs, in violation of N.J. State
Statue 39:4-50, as specified in Charge 1, Specification 4.
On April 22, 1993, you were arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey,
during your tour of duty for the commission of the following act: Driving
while licenses were suspended in New York and New Jersey, in violation of
N.J. State Statue 39:3-40, as specified in Charge 1, Specification 5.
On April 22, 1993, you were arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey,
during your tour of duty for the commission of the following act:
Application for license while suspended, in violation of N.J. State
Statue 39:3-34, as-specified in Charge 1, Specification 6.
On April 22, 1993, you were arrested in Hudson County, New Jersey,
during your tour of duty for the commission of the following act: Using a
motor vehicle without consent of owner, in violation of N.J. State Statue
39:4-48, as specified in Charge 1, Specification 7.
On April 21, 1993, while on your 11:00 p.m. - 7:00 a.m. tour of duty,
you failed to report for the 11:15 p.m. roll call and were located at about
1:30 a.m., in Staten Island, New York, in a Port Authority vehicle you did
not have authorization to use. At about 2:00 a.m. you were instructed to
return to the Lincoln Tunnel. You failed to return and were arrested at
6:40 a.m. At the time of your arrest, you admitted to signing in at the
11:00 p.m. start time, although you arrived at your work site at 9:00 p.m.,
and left shortly thereafter. You also admitted that you purchased
crack-cocaine and smoked it, as specified in Charge 1 ,• Specification 8.
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You also failed to notify the Port Authority within one business day
after your CDL vas suspended of said suspension. This one day notification
is required by the Federal Commercial Motor Safety Act of 1986, as
specified in Charge 1, Specification 9.
Also, you failed to acquire your CDL within a three week period as
you agreed to on June 29, 1992, and your driving privileges, along with
your CDL, were suspended when you reported to your new assignment on
January 31, 1993, as specified in Charge 2, Specification 1.
Furthermore, you do not and have not possessed a valid driver's
license or a valid CDL since November 10, 1992, due to the suspension of
said licenses. Since possession of a valid driver's license and a CDL is a
requisite of your position as a Trades Helper (Electrical), you fail to
meet the minimum requirements of that position. You also willfully and
knowingly operated Port Authority vehicles while said licenses were
suspended, as specified in Charge 2, Specification 2,
.,__ were absent
Finally, on February 4, 1993, and April 6, 1993,, you
without leave (AWOL), as specified in Charge 2, Specificati
Specification 3.
These actions are in violation of the General Rules and Regulations
for All Port Authority Employees, Chapter 10, Disciplinary Action,
Paragraph 2,which states,"Disciplinary action may also be taken against
employees for repeated violations of orders and rules, for repeated neglect
or failure to perform their duties, or for other repeated conduct
warranting discipline, even though action .has been taken separately on some
or all of the series of actions upon which a charge is based. Such
repetition of misconduct is in itself chargeable as a separate offense."

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY
In the Matter of the Payment of Trustee
Fees to Certain Trustees of the
Printers League - Graphic Communications
International Union Local 119B, New
York Pension Fund, Graphic Communications
International Union Local 119B, New York
- Printers League Welfare Trust Fund,
Printers League - Graphic Communications
International Union Local 119B, New York
Special Displacement Fund, Printers
League - Graphic Arts International
Union Local 43B, New York Pension Fund,
Printers League - Graphic Arts International Union Local 43B, New York
Welfare Fund, Printers League - Graphic
Arts International Union Local 43B, New
York Special Displacement Fund and the
Printers League - Graphic Arts International Union Local 119B-43B, New York
Annuity Fund

DECISION OF THE
INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY

X

APPEARANCES:
Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, P. C.
By: Irwin Bluestein, Esq.
Owen Rumelt, Esq.
Clifton Budd & DeMaria
By: Howard Estock, Esq.

Introduction
At meetings of the Boards of Trustees of the Printers
League - Graphic Communications International Union Local 119B, New
York Pension Fund, the Graphic Communications International Union
Local 119B, New York - Printers League Welfare Trust Fund, the
Printers League - Graphic Communications International Union Local
119B, New York Special Displacement Fund, the Printers League Graphic Arts International Union Local 43B, New York Pension Fund,
the Printers League - Graphic Arts International Union Local 43B,
New

York

Welfare

Fund,

the

Printers

League

-

Graphic

Arts

International Union Local 43B, New York Special Displacement Fund
and the Printers League - Graphic Arts International Union Local
119B-43B, New York Annuity Fund (collectively the "Funds") held on
June 17, 1993, it was noted that Martin Dillon ("Dillon") and
Morris

Weintraub

("Weintraub") continued

to serve as Employer

Trustees of the Funds although they had ceased employment in the
graphic arts industry.

It was suggested that, in recognition of

such service, Dillon and Weintraub be reasonably compensated for
their attendance at meetings of the Trustees.

A motion was made,

seconded and unanimously adopted directing Fund counsel to research
and report to the Trustees

on the legal issues raised by the

proposed compensation of the Employer Trustees.

Subsequently, at

the meetings of the Boards of Trustees held on September 22, 1993,
counsel advised the Trustees that reasonable compensation of a
fiduciary who was not receiving full time pay from an employer or

sponsoring association of employers whose employees participate in
the plan was permitted under the terms of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA").

Nevertheless,

certain procedural issues raised the possibility that the adoption
by the Trustees of a motion to compensate Dillon and Weintraub
might constitute a prohibited transaction under the terms of ERISA.
Counsel recommended, and the Trustees subsequently authorized, the
appointment of an independent fiduciary to consider and determine
the compensation

issue.

This matter has come before me, as

independent fiduciary, for a determination as to whether Dillon and
Weintraub shall be reasonably compensated for their services as
Trustees

of

the

Funds

and, to

the

extent

they

may

be

so

compensated, to determine the level of compensation to be paid.
Having reviewed the facts presented and applicable statutes and
regulations, I hereby find as follows.

Findings
Section 406(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"), provides that a fiduciary of a plan
shall not cause the plan to engage in a transaction if he knows
that such transaction constitutes a transfer to a party in interest
of any assets of the plan.

Section 406(b) of ERISA provides that

a fiduciary of the plan shall not deal with the assets of the plan
in his own interest or for his own account.
408(c) of ERISA provides that
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However, section

[njothing in section 406 shall be construed to
prohibit any fiduciary from receiving any
reasonable
compensation
for
services
rendered,... in the performance of his duties
with the plan; except that no person so
serving who already receives full-time pay
from an employer or an association
of
employers, whose employees are participants in
the plan...shall receive compensation from the
plan...
Dillon is the former Executive Vice President of the Printers
League Section of the Association of the Graphic Arts, Inc. (the
"Printers League"), a sponsoring organization of the Funds, having
retired

from that position in 1989.

Weintraub is the former

President of L & M Bindery, Inc. a former contributing employer to
the Funds.

L & M Bindery, Inc. ceased operations in 1992.

Neither

Dillon or Weintraub is currently receiving any compensation from
"an employer or an association of employers, whose employees are
participants
impediment

in the plan."
to

their

being

Accordingly, there is no
compensated

for their

statutory

services

as

Trustees of the Funds, provided such compensation is reasonable.
Dillon and Weintraub have served as Funds Trustees since 1985
and 1980 respectively.

Their historical knowledge and experience

are invaluable to the operation of the Funds. Although they are no
longer employed in the graphic arts industry,

they have continued

to attend approximately four to six meetings and special meetings
of the Trustees each year and have made themselves available on an
"as needed" basis for telephone consultations on matters relating
to the ongoing administration of the Funds.

In addition, the

Printers League is in the process of winding down its operations in
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the graphic

arts

industry,

and the Funds documents have been

amended to reflect this fact and to provide for removal of the
current Employer

Trustees and selection

of successor

Trustees by vote of the contributing employers.
contributing
Trustees,

Employer

The

current

employers have continued Dillon and Weintraub

and

were

either

Dillon

or Weintraub

to

resign

as
as

Trustees, there is some concern that it might prove difficult to
replace them as Employer Trustees.
find

that

it

is

reasonable

for

Based upon the foregoing, I
Dillon

and

Weintraub

to

be

compensated for their services as Trustees of the Funds.
The issue then arises as to the level of compensation to
be paid.

Department

of Labor Regulation section

2550.408c-2

provides that the guestion of whether compensation is reasonable
depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
As previously stated, the Trustees of the Funds have approximately
four to six meetings and special meetings each year.

All of the

Funds generally meet on the same day and each set of meetings
generally takes between three and six hours.

In the Trustees'

discussions during their June 17 meetings, it was suggested that
Dillon

and Weintraub

attendance

at

each

be compensated

of the

four to

a nominal sum for their
six meetings

and

special

meetings.

Decision
Based upon the foregoing, I hereby determine that Martin
Dillon and Morris Weintraub shall be compensated for their services
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rendered

as

Communications

Trustees

of

the

Printers

League

-

Graphic

International Union Local 119B, New York Pension

Fund, the Graphic Communications International Union Local 119B,
New York - Printers League Welfare Trust Fund, the Printers League
- Graphic Communications International Union Local 119B, New York
Special Displacement

Fund, the Printers League - Graphic Arts

International Union Local 43B, New York Pension Fund, the Printers
League

- Graphic Arts International Union Local 43B, New York

Welfare Fund, the Printers League - Graphic Arts
Union

Local

43B, New

York

Special Displacement

International
Fund

and the

Printers League - Graphic Arts International Union Local 119B-43B,
New York Annuity Fund in the amount of $25.00 per Fund for each
meeting or special meeting of the Boards of Trustees of the Funds
that they attend.
Dated:

December
, 1993
New York, New York

ERIC J. SCHMERTZ
State of New York
County of New York

)
) ss. :
)

I, ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, do hereby affirm upon my oath as
Independent Fiduciary that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my Decision.
December

, 1993
ERIC J. SCHMERTZ, Independent Fiduciary
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